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Women in both Europe and the United States have the benefit of
legislation designed to ensure equal pay. European women have the
legislative protection of Article 119 of the European Economic Community
(EEC) Treaty' and Council Directive 75/115 (the Equal Pay Directive).2
Women in the United States have the legislative protection of the Equal Pay
Act 3 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 Such legislation is

*

Editor's Note: This note was selected as the best note for Fall, 1995.

** This note is dedicated to my family, especially my husband, Stepfan, and my mother

and father.
1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOllC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY], Mar.
25, 1957, art. 119, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 62 (as amended 1987).
2. Council Directive 75/117, art. 1, 1975 O.J. (L 45/19) [hereinafter Equal Pay
Directive].
3. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994)).
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994)).
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required, because despite the fact that women comprise one-third of the
world's work force, they are not paid on an equal basis with men.' In 1962,
women earned sixty cents for every one dollar earned by men. By 1992,
women in the United States earned seventy-one cents for every one dollar
earned by men.6 Despite regulation, the past thirty years has realized only
a twelve-cent gain for women.7 The primary reason for this discrepancy is
the persistent under-valuation of jobs held predominantly by women.8 The
under-valuation arises because the majority of women work in traditional jobs
where 75% or more of those who work in that same job are women. 9 While
it is true that women in the United States find some protection for equal pay,
unfortunately, this protection often is narrow, illusory, and insufficient. In
spite of such striking statistics of unequal pay, the United States has not been
compelled to expand the scope of either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII to
include a "comparable worth" cause of action.'1
On the other hand, European women enjoy the fruits of aggressive
legislation aimed at gaining comparable pay." They are governed by the
European Union (EU), which advocates a "Social Europe."' 2 The EU has
made a commitment to serve both societal and economic concerns. The EU
has mandated in Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, equal pay for men and
women for equal work.' 3 Originally, this provision was included in the
treaty to address economic concerns.' 4 The European Court of Justice
(ECJ), however, interpreted Article 119 from a human rights perspective, 5
describing the right of equal pay as "fundamental."' 6 By interpreting this

5. Lariold M. Street, InternationalCommercial and Labor Migration Requirements as
a Bar to DiscriminatoryEmployment Practices, 31 How. L.J. 497, 509 (1988).

6. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REP., SERIES P60-184,
MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992
(1993).

7. See id.
8. Sandra J. Libeson, Reviving the Comparable Worth Debate in the United States: A
Look Toward the European Community, 16 COMP. LAB. L.J. 358, 359 (1995).
9. FairPay Act of 1994: Hearings on H.R. 4803 Before the House Subcomm. on Select
Education and Civil Rights and Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits, 103rd
Cong., 2d Sess., 50, 56-67 (1994) (testimony of Michele Leber, Treasurer, Natn'l Comm. on
Pay Equity).
10. Libeson, supra note 8, at 359.
11. EEC TREATY art. 119; Equal Pay Directive, supra note 2.
12. See generally Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights in the Post-1992 European
Communities: What "SocialEurope" Means to United States-BasedMultinationalEmployers,
I1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 564 (1991).
13. EEC TREATY art. 119.
14. Libeson, supra note 8, at 376.
15. Id. at 377.
16. Jill Andrews, National and International Sources of Women's Right to Equal
Employment Opportunities:Equality in Law Versus Equality in Fact, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 413, 422 (1994).
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provision broadly, the court has given European women both a shield and a
sword.' 7
This note addresses the comparative positions of women in the United
States and in Europe in the area of equal pay and comparable worth. Part
one describes legislation in the United States, including the legislative
histories of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. Part two discusses the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. Part
three describes the legislation in the EU, including the legislative histories of
Article 119 and Equal Pay Directive 75/115. Part four discusses the ECJ's
interpretation of Article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive. Part five addresses
how the United States might improve the plight of women in the area of
equal pay.
I.

THE U.S. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

A.

The Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act was not the first attempt in the United States to
mandate that men and women be paid equally. Initially, the War Labor
Board adopted a policy authorizing equal pay for comparable work in
9
1942.18 However, this policy did not result in bringing about equal pay.'
Subsequently, the Equal Pay Act was adopted.2 ° Congress adopted the
Equal Pay Act to be narrow in scope. 2 ' The Act states:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in
such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment
is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii)
a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of

17. Case 61/81, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1982 E.C.R. 2601 (1982) (authorizing
experts to pilot job evaluations in order to determine if women were receiving comparable
pay).
18. Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DuKE L.J. 1202, 1227.
19. Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
21. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 184-88 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Rehnquist, the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act was
limited only to "equal pay for equal work." Id. at 184. He wrote, "Congress carefully
considered and ultimately rejected the 'equal pay for comparable worth' standard .... " Id.
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production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate
differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to
comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate
of any employee. 2
The statute has three main elements: an equal pay for equal rate standard,
23
four employer affirmative defenses, and limitations on available remedies.
The equal pay standard does not require that a man and woman be in exactly
the same job but has been interpreted to mean a job that is "substantially
equal."2 4 Further, the men and women must work in the same establishment. 25 Thus, women have no claim under the Act, if, for example, their
employer employs only women stock clerks and
the factory next door
26
employs men stock clerks at a higher rate of pay.
[Tlhe legislative history of the ...Equal Pay Act ...reflects an
often forgotten yet similar desire on the part of some of the bill's
supporters to preserve jobs for men by mandating equal pay for
women, and to prevent "unfair competition" through payment of
substandard wages to women for performing "men's work. 27
In essence, this statute was designed not only to preclude discrimination
against women, but also to prevent males from suffering in the process.28
Further, "[t]he statute provides that denials of equal pay on the basis of sex
may only be remedied by raising women's wages to the level of men's, never
by lowering the men to the women's level, nor by equalizing somewhere in
the middle. 29
The difference between equal pay and comparable worth is important to
this discussion. The substantially equal theory requires employers pay equal
wages to employees of both sexes for equal work on jobs where the
performance requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and where they
are performed under similar working conditions.30 In determining the skill
requirement, courts look at experience, training, education, and ability.3

22. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
23. Libeson, supra note 8, at 365.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
25. Libeson, supra note 8, at 365.
26. Id.
27. Marley S. Weiss, The Impact of the European Community on Labor Law: Some
American Comparisons, 68 CH.-KENT L. REv. 1427, 1447 (1993) (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 1465.
29. Id.
30. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 471 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
31. Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1979).
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The element of responsibility is determined based on the degree of
accountability required to do the job.32 The controlling factor is not the title
of the job but the duties of the job.33 In contrast, the comparable worth
theory requires that jobs in which women historically have worked and that
have comparable value to jobs in which men historically have worked should
have the same pay as those of the men.3 4 Under the comparable worth
standard, equal pay means pay "for the same work or for work to which
equal value is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of
sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration., 35 Hence, the
comparable worth standard sets forth an equal pay for equal value standard
as compared to an equal pay for equal work standard.
The origin of the Equal Pay Act presented a standard that resembled
something more akin to the comparable worth standard rather than the
substantially equal standard. A 1961 bill proposed in the U.S. House of
Representatives would have covered work of comparable value. 36 The bill
would have required an employee to pay wages to members of the opposite
sex based on the comparable character of work that required comparable
skills, except in instances where a difference in pay could be attributed to
seniority or merit not connected to the employee's sex. 7 In 1963, another
proposed bill tried to create a comparable standard by prohibiting employers
from paying wages at a lesser rate to women in jobs that required skills equal
to those of men.38 Instead, Congress enacted the current version of the
Equal Pay Act, which only sets forth a substantially equal standard.3 9
Hence, the limited scope of the Equal Pay Act reaches only the most onerous
offenses.40
B.

Title VII

In instances where the work performed exceeds the substantially equal
standard and where a woman is being discriminated against on the basis of
her sex, her cause of action requires broader legislation than the Equal Pay
Act. In these instances, Title VII is the only remedy for U.S. women.
Similar to the Equal Pay Act, Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination also had ironic beginnings. The prohibition against sex
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Stephen A. Mazurak, Comparative Labor and Employment Law and the American
Labor Lawyer, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 531, 538-39 (1993).
35. Id. at 540.
36. Weiss, supra note 27, at 1467 n.89 (citation omitted).
37. Id.
38. H.R. 3861, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4(a) (1963); Weiss, supra note 27, at 1467 n.89.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
40. Libeson, supra note 8, at 366.
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discrimination was introduced on the floor of the House as a political
gimmick.4 In an effort to prevent Title VII from passing, Rep. Howard
Smith suggested including sex as a protectable characteristic, expecting such
a suggestion to immediately sink the chances of the bill.42 However, Title
VII passed, and as a result, the legislative history of the purpose and scope
of this provision is sketchy and unclear.43 This sketchiness has resulted in
varied and multiple interpretations of how the Equal Pay Act and Title VII
are related. 4 ' To prevent conflict between these two Acts, Senator Bennett
introduced an amendment to Title VII.45 This amendment, known as the
Bennett Amendment, was added at section 703(h) and provides that "[i]t shall
not be an unlawful employment practice under [Title VII] for any employer
to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or
compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by [the (Equal Pay Act)]. ' 46
The Bennett Amendment delineates four affirmative defenses that permit
the Equal Pay Act to be violated. Employers may differentiate in pay on the
basis of seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production (in piecework), and
any factor other than sex.47 However, instead of ending the confusion, the
Bennett Amendment heightened it. Legal commentators pondered whether
the amendment was meant to incorporate the "equal work" standard of the
Equal Pay Act into Title VII, mandate that sex-based wage discrimination
claims should fail absent a violation of the equal work standard, or
incorporate the Equal Pay affirmative defenses. 48 Those against comparable
worth wanted the courts to interpret the amendment strictly so that
comparable worth claims could not succeed under Title VII. Congress, on
the other hand, wholly rejected the idea of the courts making determinations
on the issue of comparable worth.49
This question was settled by the Supreme Court's decision in County of
Washington v. Gunther,50 when the court squarely addressed the relationship
between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. In Gunther, female guards brought

41. Robert E. Williams & Thomas R. Bagby, The Legal Framework, in

COMPARABLE

WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 197, 205 (E. Robert Livernash ed., 2d ed. 1984) (citing

110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964)).
42. Id.
43. Libeson, supra note 8, at 367.

44. Id.
45. 110 CONG. REc. 13,647 (1964).
46. Bennett Amendment, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, Title VII § 703(h) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
48. Libeson, supra note 8, at 367-68.
49. Id. at 368.
50. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
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a class action suit asserting that they were paid less than their male
counterparts. 5 1 The County of Washington used job evaluation surveys to
determine wages. 2 According to the Plaintiffs, the County was not
following the survey guidelines. 3 The Plaintiffs claimed that if the County
had followed its own guidelines, the female prison guards would have been
paid ninety-five percent as much as their male counterparts.5 They alleged
sex discrimination because they were actually paid seventy percent of what
the male guards were paid. The lower court held that the work of male
and female bodyguards were not substantially equal, so that a cause of action
under the Equal Pay Act could not survive.56 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed. 7 The court disagreed with the lower court and held that
a sex-based claim could be brought under Title VII even if it did not satisfy
the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act.5 . The Plaintiffs argued and
the court of appeals agreed that
claims for sex-based wage discrimination [could] be brought under
Title VII even [when] no member of the opposite sex holds an equal
but higher paying job provided that the challenged wage rate is not
based on seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production, or any
other factor other than sex. 9
The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that "persons alleging sex
discrimination are not precluded from suing under Title VII to protest ...
discriminatory employment practice merely because their jobs were not equal
to higher paying jobs held by members of the opposite sex."6 The Court
characterized the Bennett Amendment as only a listing of defenses available
to employers.6' However, at the same time, the Court emphasized the
narrowness of its holding6" and explicitly avoided ruling on the issue of
comparable worth.63

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
(1981).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
worth."

Id. at 164.
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 165.
Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 161
452 U.S. at 165.
Id. at 168 (citing Gunther, 623 F.2d at 1311) (citation omitted).
Id. at 181.
Libeson, supra note 8, at 369.
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 166.
Id. "Respondent's claim is not based in the controversial concept of comparable
Id.
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INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PAY BY
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

A.

Standards of Review and Current Remedies

In its contorted effort to narrow its decision as much as possible, the
Supreme Court has not set out a clear analysis for lower courts to follow in
pay-based, sex discrimination claims. The Court has interpreted Title VII to
reach those claims that employees intentionally discriminated against women
or where the employer's practice had a discriminatory effect on women.'
Hence, women can bring a claim under disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories. Disparate treatment theory requires that the employer have
an intent to discriminate against women.6"
In the case of equal pay, the prima facie case is even more difficult to
prove because the courts have explicitly held that it is not a prima facie case
of intentional discrimination for a woman to show the employer systematically undervalued jobs held predominantly by females.' The courts also have
rejected as proof of a prima facie case instances where the employer's lowest
paid jobs are filled entirely or predominantly by women. 67 Hence, the
courts' interpretations under this theory have rendered wage-based sex
discrimination claims brought under the disparate treatment theory untenable.
This leaves plaintiffs with disparate impact causes of action.
Disparate impact theory requires only that a plaintiff show the employer's
facially-neutral practice disproportionally impacts a protected class and thus,
requires no proof of intent. 61 In order to establish a prima facie case, a
plaintiff must show that an inequitable wage difference exists between the
male and female employees. 69 To demonstrate an inequitable wage
difference, a plaintiff must establish that the employer pays women at a
lower rate than men, the women and men work in the same establishment,
and the men and women are engaged in the same or substantially similar
work.70 Once the plaintiff has established the existence of inequitable pay
differences, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the employer's

64. 452 U.S. at 166. The Court stated that Title VII reached not only "overt
discrimination" but also "practices" that were "discriminatory in operation. Id. at 170.
65. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 409 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989).
66. Libeson supra note 8, at 370 (citing Janice R. Bellace, Comparable Worth in the
United States: Policy Directions in the 1990s, WHARTON REFERENCE DEPT. LEGAL STUD.,
REF. No. 122, Oct. 20, 1988, at 8).
67. Libeson, supra note 8, at 370-71.
68. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
69. Id.
70. Libeson, supra note 8, at 365.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss3/7
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practices of wage setting are not discriminatory."
B.

Reach of Title VII

Title VII does not apply extraterritorially,72 even though "Title VII
prohibits employment discrimination by employers 'engaged in an industry
affecting commerce."' 73 Commerce includes "trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States; or
between a State and any place outside thereof."74 Based on the plain
reading of the statute, its reach, and its scope, Title VII would seem to
protect U.S. women working for U.S. companies in foreign countries.
However, this is not the case. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.,75 the Supreme Court held that Title VII

did not apply to U.S. employers engaged in commerce outside of the United
States, 76 because there was no clear congressional intent to apply Title VII
extraterritorially. 77 To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to
ascribe to Congress a policy that would cause a conflict with international
laws. 7' The Court further stated that if Congress intended to apply Title VII
extraterritorially, it would have addressed the issue of conflict with foreign
laws and procedures.79
Legal scholars have heavily criticized the Court's decision. Many say
that the analysis is flawed because Title VH excludes all non U.S. citizens
outside of the United States from coverage, and hence, it does not create a
conflict of laws." ° The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) concluded that because only aliens were exempted from Title VII's
protection and not all individuals, the intent of Congress must have been to

71. Id.

72. See Conly J. Schulte, Americans Employed Abroad by United States FirmsAre Denied
ProtectionUnder Title VII: EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 351,
364 (1991).
73. Id. at 364 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b)).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g).
75. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
76. Id. at 258. In this case, a U.S. citizen, Ali Boureslan, worked for a subsidiary of
Arabian American Oil Co. Initially, he worked at Arabian American Oil Co. headquarters in
Houston, Texas. Later, he transferred to one of their offices in Saudi Arabia. It was in Saudi
Arabia that Boureslan experienced race, religious, and national origin discrimination.
Boureslan filed an employment discrimination claim against Arabian American Oil in the
Southern District of the United States. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Boureslan appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Fifth Circuit Court affirmed the district court. Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Fifth Circuit. Id. at 247.
77. Id. at 249.
78. Id. at 256.
79. Id.
80. Schulte, supra note 72, at 365-66.
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Based on the EEOC's
protect U.S. citizens at home and abroad."1
interpretation, it appears that the Court's interpretation is incorrect.8 2
The Supreme Court's ruling presents ironic consequences. Although
Title VII provides protection to aliens employed within the United States, it
does not provide protection to U.S. citizens employed by U.S. companies
outside the United States." Therefore, a woman who is an alien working
in United States is protected from discrimination based on sex, while a
woman who is a U.S. citizen working for an U.S. company overseas has no
U.S. protection. 84 As it currently stands, an U.S. company that has
discriminatory motives is able to send an employee overseas and discriminate
against that employee without suffering any legal consequences.85 As a
result, women in the United States have no cause of action against
discrimination if they work in an overseas office. 86
III.

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

A.

The European Union

The EU, formally known as the European Community, has a population
of 345 million compared with 220 million in the United States.8 7 It is
composed of fifteen countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Austria,
Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom. 8 On November 1, 1993, the
Maastricht Treaty was ratified by eleven of its then twelve members.8 9 The
United Kingdom refused to ratify the Maastricht Treaty because it disagreed
with many of its social aims. 90 The Maastricht Treaty amended the EEC
Treaty.9'
The purpose of the EU is "to lay foundations of an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe. 92 In order to achieve this, Article Three of
the EEC Treaty set forth a measure to create a European Social Fund in order
to improve the opportunities for the employment of workers and to enhance
81. Andrews, supra note 16, at 419.
82. Shulte, supra note 72, at 373.
83. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973).
84. Andrews, supra note 16, at 420-21.
85. Id. at 421.
86. Id.
87. EC Institutions and the DecisionMaking Process, Aug. 11, 1994, availablein LEXIS,
Intlaw library, EECOM file [hereinafter EC Institutions].
88. Id.
89. Id.at 1.
90. Michael H. Abbey & Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner's Guide to the Maastricht
Treaty, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1329, 1332 (1994).

91. Id. at 1329.
92. EC Institutions, supra note 87, at 2 (quoting The Treaty of Rome) (citation omitted).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss3/7

10

1994]

EQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN

Reddick-Martin: Women's Right to Equal pay in the International Workplace: Is the

workers' standards of living. 9 The most controversial provision of the
Maastricht Treaty is the Agreement on Social Policy that was adopted by
every member except the United Kingdom. 94 The United Kingdom is
excluded from the legislative process because it did not ratify this
provision.95 The Treaty grants broad measures in the area of employment
law.96 o Specifically, the Treaty authorizes gender equality of opportunity and
treatment.97
Even before the Maastricht treaty, Article 119 of the treaty establishing
the EEC more explicitly provided protection for women in the workplace. 9
Article 119 requires each Member State to ensure that men and women
receive equal pay for equal work.99 Later, the Equal Pay Directive was
adopted to enforce and broaden the effect of Article 119.)0 The directive
broadened the definition of equal pay to include "work to which equal value
is attributed."''
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been central in
interpreting the Equal Pay Directive to support comparable worth claims.'0 2
In order to fully understand the role of the ECJ and its impact on EU
citizens, one first must have some knowledge of the political process in EU.
There are seven administrative institutions within EU: The European
Commission, The Council of the European Union, The European Parliament,
The Court of Auditors of the European Union, The European Court of
Justice, and The Court of First Instance (CFI).'13 It is important to
understand where each fits into the political process.
The European Commission proposes and enforces EU legislation in
keeping with the treaties."° The Commission acts as a guardian of the
treaties checking and ensuring that directives are correctly implemented by
members of EU. 0 5 The Council of the European Union" is the EU's
legislative body and is responsible for making decisions on Commission
proposals. 0 7 Ministers are appointed by their respective countries on the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Abbey & Bromfield, supra note 90, at 1332.
Id.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
EEC TREATY art. 119.
Id.
Id.
Equal Pay Directive, supra note 2, art. 1; see also Libeson, supra note 8, at 360.
Libeson, supra note 8, at 360.
EC Institutions, supra note 87, at 3.1.
Id. at 3.2.
Id.
Id. at 3.3. Formerly the Council of Ministers. Id.
Id.
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basis of the issues being discussed. ' Ministers are required to answer
The Ministers
only to their national governments and parliaments."°
1
The Council may
defend individual national viewpoints and interests.
vote by unanimity, simple majority, or a more qualified majority, depending
on the procedure prescribed in the Treaty."1 The European Council is a
EU institution that defines broad lines of policy and breaks deadlocks
between Member states.'1 2 The European Council consists of the Heads
of State or Government of the Member States." 3 The European Parliament
consults with the Council on legislative proposals that it receives from the
Commission." 4 Parliament must give an 'Opinion' on the legislative
The Council is not obligated to adopt the Opinion of
proposal. 1
Parliament, it is only required to consult with the Parliament. 1 6 Parliament
is elected by a vote of member state constituents.17 The Court of Auditors
keeps a check on EU budget spending."'
The Court of First Instance (CFI) has jurisdiction to decide "staff cases"
and disputes brought against the EU." 9 The CFI is the final court of
appeals on questions of fact but may be appealed on questions of law.' 20
The CFI was created to ease the burdensome caseload of the ECJ.' 21 The
ECJ's function is to ensure that the interpretation and application of the
Treaties and the rules governing their implementation are observed."
ECJ's jurisdiction includes actions that originate before it and cases referred
23 The ECJ's rulings are final.12
to it by National Courts or Tribunals.
Private law suits are brought in National Courts and may be referred to ECJ
to resolve unclear areas of law. 2 However, the ECJ does have original

108. EC Institutions, supra note 87, at 3.3.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Votes for a qualified majority are weighted, apportioning more votes to larger
countries. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3.4.
114. Id. at 3.5.
115. Id. at 3.5. Parliament handles with these proposals in specialist committees. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 3.6.
119. Id. at 3.8.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3.7.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. EEC TREATY arts. 118-119. These articles include a Social Provision Chapter with
articles bearing on employment (art. 118) and equal enumeration for equal work by men (art.
119), as well as others. Id. Private parties cannot sue or be sued in the ECJ. Id. All causes
of action must be brought in National courts, which may appeal to the ECJ. Id.
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jurisdiction over causes of action to enforce Treaty obligations that are
brought by the Commission or by a Member State.'26
B.

Article 119

Under the EU's legislative process, an Article of a treaty is similar to a
provision of the U.S. Constitution, in that it is considered law for all the
Member states. Article 119 states:
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and
women should receive equal pay for equal work.
For the purpose of this Article, "pay" means the ordinary basic
or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in
cash or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in
respect of his employment from him employer. Equal pay without
discrimination based on sex means:
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated
on the basis of the same unit of measurement;
(b) that pay for work a time rates shall be the same for the same
job. 127
However, if a Member State is not implementing a particular Article of the
Treaty in its country, the Commission may adopt a directive or a regulation
to implement Union policies. 12' Regulations are binding over all Member
States, akin to a U.S. federal law. 29 On the other hand, a directive is
binding only on the Member States to which it is addressed. 30 Further, a
directive permits the States to implement EU's law in their own form or
method. 3' This allows the Member States themselves to address the policy
differences that may exist between individual States32and the EU, allowing the
States to retain their own diverse legal traditions.
C. Equal Pay Directive
When Member States proved slow and inefficient in implementing
Article 119, the Commission proposed legislation in the form of the Equal

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at arts. 169, 170, 173, 175, & 184.
Id. at art. 119.
ECInstitutions,supra note 87, at 5.1.
Id.
Id.
Id.

132. See Weiss, supra note 27, at 1434.
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Pay Directive133 to assure that "for the same work or for work to which
equal value is attributed... all discrimination on grounds of sex with regard
34
to all aspects and conditions of remuneration would be eliminated.
There are several interesting aspects to the Equal Pay Directive. First,
the principle enunciated in this directive embodies the U.S. definition of
comparable worth.' 35 Secondly, Article Two of the directive commands
that job classification systems "be based on the same criteria for both men
and women and so drawn to exclude any discrimination on the grounds of
sex."' 36 Even this broad statement is not the exclusive measure of comparable worth.' 37 Member States must provide avenues for redress to
women who believe they have an equal pay claim, and in direct contrast with
U.S. courts, the directive allows the use of independent job evaluation in
equal pay claims. 38 Further, Member States must remove any national
policy that is inapposite to the principle of equal pay. 139 Member States
were given one year after the adoption of the directive to comply in all
aspects. 4 ° Those States that do not comply have proceedings initiated
against them by the Commission.' 4 '
IV.

INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PAY BY
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

A.

Standards of Review and CurrentRemedies

Even though the language in Article 119 closely resembles that of the
Equal Pay Act, the ECJ has granted much more protection to European
women than the Supreme Court has granted to U.S. women. Both require
that jobs performed under like conditions by men and women which require
equal skill, effort and responsibility should be paid at the same rate unless
the employer is able to assert a authorized defense. 142 The ECJ expanded
its interpretation of Article 119 liberally, holding that the right to equal pay
was a fundamental right. 4 3 This interpretation of Article 119 was expanded even further with the subsequent legislation of the Equal Pay Direc-

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Libeson, supra note 8, at 379.
Equal Pay Directive, supra note 2, art. I (emphasis added).
Libeson, supra note 8, at 379.
Id. at 379-80 (quoting the Equal Pay Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(2)).
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Mazurak, supra note 34, at 534-35.
Andrews, supra note 16, at 422.
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tive.' 44 The Equal Pay Directive set forth a standard of equal pay for equal
value as the rule of law in the EU.'4 5 This is different than the U.S.
standard of equal pay for equal work. 146 Under the U.S. equal pay
standard, a woman may only bring a claim if she asserts that the employer
is not paying equal wages to employees of both sexes for equal work on jobs
that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility that are performed under
similar working conditions. 47 Under the EU's comparable worth standard,
a woman may assert a claim by contending that the job in which she works
is one in which women have historically worked and that the job should pay
the same as jobs in which men historically have worked if the value to the
employer is the same."' Two cases exemplify ECJ's standard of review
and the impact of Article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive. In Defrenne v.
Sabena,149 the ECJ held that "member countries were required to take
50
measures necessary to give full effect to the principles of equal pay."'1
In effect, the ECJ imposed an affirmative duty on members states to act on
behalf of women.' 5' In a subsequent case, Commission v. United,Kingdom, 5 2 the ECJ more clearly enunciated the standard for the Equal Pay
Directive. At that time, the United Kingdom had a law that required an
employer to equalize the pay if the employer conducted a job survey and
found that jobs had equal value but not pay. 5 The United Kingdom took
the position that its law met the threshold of Article 119 and the Equal Pay
Directive. 54
The ECJ disagreed. 55
The ECJ held that United
Kingdom's law did not go far enough in giving women the full effect of
equal pay.'56 The ECJ stated that United Kingdom's law fell short because
employers were not required to conduct the job survey in the first instance. 57 It held that in order for the United Kingdom to comply with the
Directive, it must enact formal adjudicative procedures to handle the claims
of individuals who perceived that they had been unfairly treated by

144. Mazurak, supra note 34, at 539-40.
145. Id. at 540.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
147. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 471 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
148. Mazurak, supra note 34, at 538-39.
149. Case 43/75, 1976 E.C.R. 455 (1976).
150. Mazurak, supra note 34, at 540.
151. Id. Note, however, that the Defrenne case concerned equal pay for equal work, not
equal pay for equal value. Id.
152. Case 61/81, 1982 E.C.R. 2601, 3 C.M.L.R. 284 (1982).
153. See id. at 286.
154. Id. at 298.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 298-99.
157. Id.
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The equal pay for work of equal value standard set forth by the ECJ
assures European women that they will be paid on a basis comparable to men
and not be saddled with sex-based pay differentials.' 59 Instrumental in this
regard has been ECJ's practice of commissioning outside experts to conduct
job evaluations to determine comparable worth."6 The Supreme Court and
other courts in the United States have firmly refused to pursue this avenue
as a means of redress for women.' 61 Instead, the courts have steadfastly
held that this was outside the province of the courts.' 62 The United States
should look to the EU and follow its lead in ending sex-based wage
discrimination.
B.

Reach and Application of Article 119 and
the Equal Pay Directive

Citizens in the EU do not always have the same access to the courts as
U.S. citizens. The EEC Treaty has delineated two distinct causes of action,
horizontal direct effect and vertical direct effect. 63 Horizontal direct effect
causes of action allow a citizen to sue another citizen, for example, an
employee suing an employer."6 Vertical direct effect causes of action
allow a citizen to bring suit against Member State action, based on a EU
provision, for example, a citizen suing Germany for not implementing an
article of the Treaty.

165

1. Vertical Direct Effect
In the area of sex discrimination, vertical direct effect has been enforced
in two ways.'
When a Member State's law violates a directive, the
Commission may bring a cause of action against it in the ECJ. 67 If the
Commission prevails, then the ECJ will issue a declaration that requires the
Member State to comply with the directive. 68 This remedy does not have
the same direct effect to which U.S. citizens are accustomed. In this

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Libeson, supra note 8, at 360.
Id. at 360-61.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Weiss, supra note 27, at 1436-37.
Id.
Id.
Andrews, supra note 16, at 433.
Id.
Id.
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instance, the sanction placed upon the offending Member State is a
prospective international sanction.' 69 No private remedy accrues to persons
who may have suffered due to violations of the law. 7
The second method of enforcement is by private parties. However, at
least one of the two conditions must be met in order for citizens to pursue
a private cause of action. 7 ' The first condition is that a Community
provision must impose an enforceable obligation to individuals or public
bodies or both. 7 2 The second condition is that the article or directive in
question must have been sufficiently and precisely interpreted so that an
enforceable obligation has accrued; if so, then an individual could invoke the
Community provision.73 However, directives against sex discrimination
apply only to Member States not to the above mentioned entities.'74 This
means that individual employers are excluded. 75 Hence,7 6European women
do not have a private cause of action against employers.
2.

Horizontal Direct Effect

A horizontal direct effect claim may be brought by a woman against an
individual employer at the national courts level.'77 National courts are
78
given wide discretion in interpreting social policy for their states.
However, if the national court fails to remedy the situation, a European
79
woman may then challenge the national court's decision in the ECJ.
In the United States, a comparable appeal would be from a state supreme
court decision. In such a case the parties remain the same. However, before
the EJC, the defendant would become the Member State and not the
employer. 80 If the European woman prevails, she will be granted prospective relief in the sense that the national court must then modify its
decision.'
However, no personal relief in terms of damages or personal
declaratory relief is available. 82

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 433-34.
Id. at 434.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 433.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 435.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

In the United States, more attention should be paid to the European
model of comparable worth. The European model of comparable worth
assures equal pay for work of equal value.183 The Equal Pay Directive
requires the employer to base rates of pay on the same criteria, so that
women will not be discriminated against on the basis of sex." The ECJ
has gone even further than the EU's legislature in declaring that women have
a "fundamental" right to equal pay."8 5 In its analysis, the ECJ takes into
account the systematic undervaluation ofjobs predominantly held by women.
The most instructive portion of EU's model that should be adopted in the
United States is the practice of commissioning outside experts to conduct job
evaluations to determine comparable worth. The EU has shown that
commissioning experts is within the province of the courts. Further, the
EU's use of outside experts has not proven to be unwieldy.
Although some legal commentators have begun a dialogue on this
subject, many legal practitioners have largely ignored the EU model. The
primary reason for this is the belief that such a model is unworkable in the
United States. Two main assumptions stifle the comparable worth effort in
the United States. The first assumption is that comprehensive job evaluations
are not feasible. The second assumption is that market conditions, not
discrimination, contribute heavily to sex-based wage differentials. The first
assumption is easily discounted once it is acknowledged that the EU has
successfully implemented and carried out this task in an industrial society in
only fifteen years. The second assumption is rebuttable in two ways. First,
the courts already have accepted the basic premise that persons discriminate
when given the opportunity. Second, the second assumption can only be
disproved with the implementation of a comparable worth model. It is then
that a statistical study can be done to determine the specific cause of sexbased wage differentials.
The United States could benefit from a study of the EU's handling of
equal pay. A study of comparative law in this area would provide a path for
the United States and a basis for a more reasoned discussion and evaluation
of feasible theories. By looking to the EU system, perhaps the United States
will realize that more can be done to create equality of pay for all its citizens.

183. Equal Pay Directive, supra note 2, at 19.
184. Libeson, supra note 8, at 380.
185. Andrews, supra note 16, at 422.
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